Security
How Slip keeps your items private
The short version: your devices scramble each item before it leaves, using a key the server never receives. This page explains exactly how, and where the limits are.
The key
When you set up Slip, your device makes 32 random bytes. That is your pairing secret. It is the only thing your devices share, and it is what the QR code and the pairing link contain.
In the link, the secret sits after the #. Browsers do not send that part of an address to any server, so the server that hosts Slip never receives it.
Each device turns the secret into two values using SHA-512. The first is an encryption key, which stays on the device. The second is an access token, which the device shows to the server to prove it belongs to your space. The server keeps only a hash of that token, which it uses as your space’s ID. Neither the token nor the ID can be turned back into the key, and knowing the ID alone does not let anyone read or change your space.
The encryption
Every item is encrypted on your device with NaCl secretbox (XSalsa20 and Poly1305) from the TweetNaCl library, with a fresh random nonce each time. The same construction protects the item from being read and from being altered. The encryption is a standard, published one. How Slip derives its keys and how devices talk to the server is its own design, and nobody outside has reviewed it.
How one item travels
The pairing secret is kept in the storage of each browser you pair. It leaves a device in only two ways: inside the QR code, and inside the pairing link after the #, which browsers never send to a server. It is in none of the requests the app makes. You can confirm that yourself with your browser’s network tools, and when the source is published you can read the whole client, a few thousand plain lines with nothing hidden. Until then, this is the path one item takes:
The only time the key crosses between devices is pairing, and that hop goes through a QR code or a link you carry yourself, not through the server.
What the server stores
| Stored | Why |
|---|---|
| The encrypted item | To deliver it to devices that were off when it was sent |
| When it was sent, when its lifetime last changed, and when it expires | To erase it on time |
| Your space ID | To know which devices to deliver to |
| An email address, only if you give one | To tell you when the iPhone app is out |
The server can also observe what any server can: your IP address while you are connected, how many devices are in your space and when each connects, how large each encrypted item is, and when you send. Slip’s own server does not write these to a log. What it does keep is a tally of counts for the whole relay — pages loaded, devices connected, items moved — and no count in it says which space, device or message it came from. The companies that host it and carry its traffic can see connection details such as your IP address, and may log them.
The times attached to an item are not protected by the encryption. A dishonest server, or anyone holding your access token, could change when an item expires, delete it, or send back an item you had deleted. They still could not read it or change its contents.
When an item expires or you delete it, the server erases it and tells every connected device to drop it. Devices that are off drop it the next time they connect. An “until copied” item is removed the same way after the first copy, or after a day. Whatever was copied stays on that device’s clipboard, which Slip does not control.
Limits you should know
- Not audited. No outside firm has reviewed Slip. The source code is not published yet; publishing it is planned.
- The pairing link is the key. Anyone who gets your link or scans your code can read your items. Treat it like a house key. On iPhone the link stays in Safari’s address bar until you add Slip to your home screen. If someone sends you a pairing link for a space that is not yours, Slip asks before switching; keep your current space unless you asked for the link.
- No remote removal. You cannot yet remove a single lost device from a space. If a device is lost unlocked, start a new space on your other devices. How to start a new space
- One key for the whole space. There is no forward secrecy. Someone who obtains the key and a copy of old encrypted items could read those items.
- You trust the page. Like every web app that encrypts in the browser, Slip relies on the server sending honest code. The planned iPhone app and published source reduce that trust.
- Unlocked devices. Anyone who can open Slip on an unlocked paired device can read what is there. Short lifetimes help.
What it is not for
Do not store passwords, seed phrases or recovery codes in Slip. Use a password manager. Slip is for things that pass through: a note, a link, an address, a one-time code.
Wallet addresses
Slip shows Bitcoin and Ethereum-style addresses in groups of four and marks the first and last group, to make them easier to compare after pasting. Always compare the whole address: some scams use look-alike addresses that match at both ends. Slip does not detect or block clipboard malware, and it does not recognize every kind of address.
Reporting a problem
If you find a security problem, write to [email protected].
Ten seconds to set up
Stop DMing yourself.
Open Slip here and scan the code with your phone. The next thing you paste into it shows up on the other device.